



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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**Sir Geoffrey Howe, former Chancellor
of the Exchequer, now Foreign Minister**



**Nigel Lawson, former Secretary of State
for Energy, now Chancellor of the Exchequer**



**Cecil Parkinson, former Paymaster General,
now Minister of Industry and Trade**

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UK: Changes in Leadership

Prime Minister Thatcher's Cabinet changes and Labor leader Foot's decision to resign mark the rise of a new generation of leaders in the Conservative and Labor Parties.

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The election last week has brought about its expected results, with Thatcher enhancing her control of the government and the Conservative Party, and Foot announcing that he will not stand for reelection at Labor's annual conference in October. Two Laborites, moderate Peter Shore and leftist Neil Kinnock, already have said they will be candidates to succeed Foot.

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Comment: The apparent withdrawal of former Home Secretary Whitelaw and former Foreign Secretary Pym from active politics removes the most prominent representatives of the traditional upper class Tory elite from the Thatcher government.

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The men Thatcher has promoted—Sir Geoffrey Howe, Cecil Parkinson, and Nigel Lawson—are from a lower middle class background similar to the Prime Minister's, and they represent what she sees as more tough-minded leadership. While the presence of Pym on the back benches could serve as a focus for moderate Tory discontent, Thatcher is clearly attempting to reshape the Conservative Party in her image and establish candidates for the future party leadership who will carry on with her policies.

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Foot's resignation could also clear the way for a new generation of leaders. Labor's leader and deputy leader will be elected by a complex electoral college in which the trade unions usually play the decisive role. Union leaders will probably attempt to find candidates acceptable to moderates and leftists, but the task will be difficult.

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Although Labor deputy leader Healey may decide to run again for the leadership, he is likely to face demands that he also step down in favor of a younger man. Another moderate, Roy Hattersley, is also likely to announce his candidacy before nominations for the posts close early next month. Shore, who is shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, will be the early favorite, but he could face a strong challenge from the popular Kinnock, a rising star in the party who is likely to be the standard bearer for its left wing.

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Brian Mulroney

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CANADA: Tories Choose New Leader

Brian Mulroney, who won the leadership of Canada's Progressive Conservative Party on Saturday, apparently plans to base Tory policy on advocating economic growth through private-sector stimulation and on promoting closer cooperation with Canada's allies, particularly the US. [REDACTED]

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Mulroney—a lawyer and former business executive, and the first Quebecer to be chosen Tory leader—now faces the task of uniting the traditionally fractious Tories. Although criticized for never having held elective office, he is reputed to be a tough negotiator and has strong managerial skills. He heads a party that has been out of office for 41 of the past 48 years and that recent polls indicate has slipped in its lead over the Liberals from 25 to 18 percentage points. [REDACTED]

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The new party leader is an advocate of reduced government interference in the economy. Mulroney argues that domestic and foreign investors need to be assured that Ottawa is committed to free enterprise, and he has proposed accelerated tax writeoffs for capital investment and some relaxation in regulations governing foreign investment. [REDACTED]

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In foreign affairs, Mulroney has stressed the need for closer ties with Canada's NATO allies and a strengthening of the country's conventional forces. He has been a strong supporter of US policies on disarmament and on Central America. In addition, he has shown little sympathy toward Canadians who oppose possible testing of US cruise missiles in Canada. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Mulroney will afford the Tories both effective leadership and an excellent chance to defeat the Liberals in the next election, which has to be held by February 1985. This prospect, in fact, could speed up Prime Minister Trudeau's retirement. [REDACTED]

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
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Ethnic Composition of 18-Year-Olds in the Soviet Union: Slavic Versus Non-Slavic




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USSR: Conscript Demand and Draft-Age Males, 1965-94

Thousands



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
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
USSR: Military Manpower Problems Ahead

A decline in the number of those eligible for the draft in the next 10 years and an increase in non-Slavic conscripts in the same period probably will force the Soviets to extend the draft term, use more minorities in sensitive posts, and lower standards for officers.




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As the number of draft-eligible youths shrinks, the ethnic mix will shift substantially toward minority populations, primarily from Central Asia. Historically, doubts about the reliability, combat worthiness, and language abilities of non-Slavic groups led to a policy of assigning minorities to less important units.




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Although minorities compose more than a third of the current draft pool, they make up less than one-fifth of forces with military functions similar to those of US forces and only 10 percent of the officer corps. Some two-thirds of the Internal Security, Construction, and Railroad Troops are non-Slavic.




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Comment: Current force levels can be maintained by increasing the basic draft term, but this would entail increasing the proportion of non-Slavs in key units. An increase from two years to two and one-half would meet the draft rate requirements through 1990. Such a step, however, would slow the growth of the civilian labor force somewhat in the 1980s from 6.3 to 5.7 percent, or by the equivalent of about 900,000 workers.




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Military manpower deficiencies probably have been aggravated by the continuing expansion of the ground forces structure. New units are being added, and the organizations of others are being enlarged. Moscow may lower peacetime manning levels of units in the USSR to reduce the impact of the expansion on total manpower needs.



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It will be difficult, however, to retain the current Slavic dominance of the officer corps without lowering educational standards. By 1990, 30 percent—up from 20 percent in 1980—of male Slavic college graduates will have to become professional officers if the corps is to remain 90 percent Slavic.



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To reduce the disruptive effects of the greater reliance on minority conscripts, the Soviets are stressing political training and Russian language instruction for minorities. As military commanders cope with demographic changes among conscripts, they may be forced to accept gradual decreases in training proficiency and higher levels of ethnic tension, which could undermine unit morale and cohesiveness.



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FRANCE: Response to Police Protests

The government is concerned about recent demonstrations by disgruntled police, and the US Embassy reports that President Mitterrand is especially upset that protesters were allowed so close to his office. Patrolmen on duty openly sympathized with the demonstrators,

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The Paris police chief has banned a further street demonstration planned for Thursday, and the government is confining all off-duty police to quarters on that day.

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Comment: Police complaints stem from such Socialist policies as repealing the death penalty and restricting police powers of detention and search. Opposition leader Chirac also has assailed what he calls a permissive atmosphere since the Socialists came to power. Rightwing unions representing a minority of police have backed the protests, but leaders of the larger police unions have deplored such indiscipline.

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VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA-ASEAN: Deadlock Continues

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach's stops in the Philippines and Thailand last week failed to change either country's position on Kampuchea.

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Comment: Hanoi probably viewed Thach's visits as an opportunity to test ASEAN support for the Kampuchean resistance following Vietnam's recent dry season offensive and its troop withdrawals last month. Moreover, Thach avoided committing Hanoi to Bangkok's proposal that Vietnamese troops withdraw to positions 30 kilometers from the Thai-Kampuchean border. No significant movement on the Kampuchean issue is likely before October, when the UN General Assembly convenes and the Vietnamese try again to unseat representatives of the resistance-backed Democratic Kampuchean Government.

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BULGARIA-ROMANIA: Drought Problems

[redacted] drought
conditions in much of Bulgaria and southern Romania have seriously
damaged crops. [redacted]
[redacted]

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Comment: Bulgaria's grain harvest this year probably will fall
some 25 to 30 percent below the planned goal of 10 million tons.
Bulgaria can afford to increase imports, but it is likely to deal with its
grain shortage by imposing harsher austerity measures in an effort to
cut consumption. Losses in Romania already are considerable and
could be disastrous unless the corn crop receives rain during the next
month. Hard currency problems will limit Bucharest's ability to
increase grain imports sufficiently to prevent a further deterioration in
Romania's already poor food situation. [redacted]

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
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Pope's Itinerary, 16-23 June 1983



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Special Analysis

POLAND: The Pope's Visit

The impact of the second visit of Pope John Paul II to his native Poland, from 16 to 23 June, probably will be mainly emotional rather than political. The visit is unlikely to lead to a significant increase in resistance activity or to contribute greater legitimacy to the authorities. The government has been unwilling to make concessions before the Pope comes, and it probably will not change its tough policies afterward. For most Poles the visit will provide memories to sustain them during the hard years ahead, and such memories could have a powerful effect on future behavior. [redacted]

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Since the Pope's first visit, in 1979, the leadership of the Polish Catholic Church has been preparing to have him help commemorate the 600th anniversary of Poland's most sacred icon. The Church thus has muted its criticism of the regime's policies, but this has sorely tested its unity. [redacted]

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Church leaders expect few tangible achievements from the visit.

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[redacted] Efforts by the Church to urge the government to declare a general amnesty have been rebuffed, and work by Church and government officials on a law granting legal status to the Church and on an agreement establishing diplomatic relations between Warsaw and the Vatican appears to be stalled. [redacted]

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Solidarity supporters have been divided over the visit. Some activists have argued that only the regime will gain. Others, including Lech Walesa, have publicly welcomed the visit in the belief that it will provide encouragement to the government's opponents. [redacted]

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Premier Jaruzelski has taken a calculated risk. He probably believes that denying the visit would have been disruptive politically and that he may be able to turn it to his advantage. The authorities now are more confident that the security services can contain any upsurge in pro-Solidarity activism, and they say publicly that they will use the trip to press the West for an easing of sanctions. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, the government recently warned that it will not tolerate the exploitation of Church facilities for antiregime activity. Hardliners in the leadership apparently are trying to use the visit to undercut Jaruzelski. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Attitude

Moscow has been largely silent about the Pope's visit, in contrast to its public misgivings last year. The absence of negative commentary suggests that the Soviets hope the event will contribute to increased legitimacy for the regime and help lead to a relaxation of economic sanctions. Foreign Minister Gromyko reportedly told a Polish official recently that Moscow has nothing against the visit, provided it does not endanger the reestablishment of party authority. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets presumably have closely monitored Warsaw's planning for the visit, looking for any sign that the regime is being too accommodating. Soviet media criticism last month of Polish party moderates may have been intended partly to warn the government against making unilateral concessions. One TASS report has conveyed Soviet displeasure at proposals for a meeting between Walesa and the Pope. [REDACTED]

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Moscow will be quick to criticize Warsaw if the Pope's stay gives renewed momentum to opposition activity. Soviet ideologists blame the rise of Solidarity on the Pope's visit in 1979. An article in *Izvestiya* last Thursday attacking anti-Sovietism in Poland may have been a warning against anti-Soviet activity during the visit this month. [REDACTED]

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The Visit

The Pope will give at least 30 sermons or addresses in six major cities. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He probably will meet with Walesa, although in a way that will not totally offend the regime. [REDACTED]

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The underground leadership has said it does not want open demonstrations to be held, but opposition groups or individuals will show their antiregime sentiment by displaying banners and the "V" signal. [REDACTED]

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Church-appointed officials will have the primary responsibility for crowd control. In addition, the government will keep large numbers of police and special riot control forces immediately available. [REDACTED]

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Security for the Pope's personal safety will be tight. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The government could use the security issue to round up suspected Solidarity troublemakers. [REDACTED]

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Aftereffects

An orderly visit could help bring the regime a step closer to the formal lifting of martial law, although private comments by officials suggest this is not imminent. A senior Church official has noted privately that such a step would be an empty gesture that would have little effect on repressive policies. [REDACTED]

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There probably will be no fundamental change in Church-state relations. Sporadic harassment of the Church will continue, but Jaruzelski recognizes that he continues to need the moderating influence of the Church. Glomp believes that, although Jaruzelski is a dedicated Communist, the Church has to establish a working relationship with him. [REDACTED]

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The opposition will be encouraged, but one of the senior underground leaders recently commented that there would be no benefits in the near term. After the Pope leaves, most Poles probably will suffer a psychological letdown that will reinforce their alienation. [REDACTED]

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